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THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT: THE NEED FOR A HEIGHTENED
BURDEN OF PROOF AS A PREREQUISITE FOR FORFEITURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the False Claims Act of 1863 (FCA or the Act),1 also
known as the "Abraham Lincoln Law," 2 has been the federal government's
chief weapon against fraud.' Enacted in response to rampant fraud commit-
ted by public contractors upon the Union government,4 its applicability has
been extended to the areas of health care fraud, welfare fraud, and defense pro-
curement fraud.' The False Claims Act is divided into separate civil6 and
criminal provisions.7 For the most part, however, the civil portion of the Act
is the primary means of Government action.'
I. Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988)).
Originally, the False Claims Act incorporated both civil and criminal sanctions, and was
codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-235. In 1982, Title 31 of the United States Code was reorganized,
and the criminal section of the FCA was recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982). 132 CONG.
REC. H6479 (Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
2. Sterling Millwrights, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 49, 94 (1992); 132 CONG. REC.
H6479 (Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
3. 132 CONG. REC. S11,243 (Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley); 132 CONG. REC.
H6480 (Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fish).
4. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273 [hereinafter "S. REP."]. The frauds committed during the
Civil War generally consisted of selling products to the Army which were either defective, or
not what they purported to be. For example, one Major McKinstry reportedly purchased
1,000 mules, at $119 a head, even though some of the mules were blind or diseased, and
virtually all of the mules were useless. False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman) [hereinafter "1986
FCA Hearing"]. Another example, as reported by Sen. Jacob Howard during the Senate
debates of Feb. 14, 1863, was that shells which were sold to the army were not filled with
gunpowder, but rather sawdust. False Claims Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1 (1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley, quoting Sen. Howard) [hereinafter "1985
FCA Hearing"].
5. See S. REP., supra note 4, at 5274. The area of health care fraud is a rapidly growing
area in the fight against fraud, and shows the particularly draconian nature of the civil FCA.
Brian McCormick, Health Fraud Prosecutors Increasingly Turning to Civil Arena, AM. MED.
NEWS, Nov. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. A new area of False Claims Act
activity is fraudulent auto accident claims. Tim O'Brien, Feds Take New Tack in P. I. Fraud
Fight, N.J. L.J., Jan. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
6.31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988).
8. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1842 (1992). As the interest in health care reform has
increased, there has been an attendant push for more criminal actions for health care fraud.
Several reasons exist for a shift in emphasis to criminal prosecution:
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Although the Act has always been the Government's primary tool in
fighting fraud, it was perceived that the Act had become substantially weak-
ened in the intervening years, and at a time when the war against fraud was at
a critical stage. 9 By 1986, it was suspected that the amount of public funds
being lost to fraud was somewhere in the range of hundreds of millions of
dollars to $50 billion per year.1" This number is substantially higher when
health care fraud is included, which is believed to cost the United States
between $30 million and $100 billion annually." This fraudulent conduct was
First, the magnitude of health care fraud is perceived to be huge and uncontrollable by
civil sanctions. Second, there is a belief that because physicians and other health care
providers hold privileged positions of trust in the health care system, violations should
be corrected and punished vigorously. Third, the emphasis is part of the federal
government's overarching priority of prosecuting white collar crime. Finally, the federal
government is increasingly looking at criminal sanctions as a source of additional revenue.
Charles H. Roistacher & Catherine M. Cook, Battling Fraud and Abuse; Efforts to Control
Health Costs Are Enlisting Law Enforcement Agencies to Pursue Fraud as a Federal Crime,
Recorder Mar. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Despite the increased attention
on criminal prosecutions, the majority of the cases will be civil actions, due to the less stringent
burden of proof and the greater likelihood of prevailing. Amy Boardman, Health Care Fraud
Booms Arrives, Tex. Law., Nov. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
9. Neil V. Getnick, Enacting and Enhancing False Claims Statutes, 208 N.Y. L.J., Nov.
26, 1990, at 20, 21. Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department
of Justice's Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN.
L.J. 409, 416 (1993). In 1943, the FCA's qui tam provision was amended to restrict the
availability of the qui tam action, by barring a qui tam action based on information which the
government possesses. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (Qui tam is derived from the latin
phrase "qui tam pro domine rege quam pro sic ipso in hoc parte sequitur," or "who as well
for the king for himself sues in the matter.") The effect of this amendment was made clear in
United States ex rel State of Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984), where
Wisconsin was precluded from pursuing a qui tam action based on the information which it
was responsible for obtaining and giving to the federal government. There have also been
amendments Pub. L. 97-258, 96 Stat. 978 (1982) (moved criminal part of the FCA to 18
U.S.C. § 287 and recodified the civil portion at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31); Pub. L. No. 100-700,
102 Stat. 4638 (1988) (clarifying rights of the federal government in deciding whether to join
a qui tam action, and the effect of the decision); Pub. L. No. 101-280, § 10(a), 104 Stat. 162
(1990) (defining "senior executive branch official" in § 3730(e)(2)(B)). These amendments,
however, have been simply clarifications or technical changes.
10. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5267. These figures were taken from estimates made by the
General Accounting Office, the Department of Justice, the Inspectors general, among others.
Id. It is important to note, however, that estimation is difficult because most fraud goes
unreported. Id. (citing GAO Report to Congress, Fraud in Government Programs: How
Extensive is it? How Can it be Controlled?, 1981.
11. Roistacher & Cook, supra note 8, at 6. It is believed that health care fraud comprises
approximately 3-10% of total health care costs, which are estimated to be near one trillion
dollars. Id. Typical examples of health care fraud include billing for services not rendered,
misrepresenting services given, receiving kickbacks, and issuing self-referrals. Health Care
Fraud and Abuse: Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, FED. Doc.
CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TEST., 5-7 (May 25, 1994) (statement of Michael Mangano, Principle
Deputy Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services), available in LEXIS,
[Vol. 28:3
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believed to exist in all Government programs. 2 Furthermore, it was believed
that this massive fraud was significantly affecting the huge budget deficit, 3
and that the recoupment of money lost to fraud was needed to help reduce the
budget. "
In response to this perceived crisis, Congress enacted dramatic amend-
ments to the False Claims Act in 1986." The purposes of the new amend-
ments was to strengthen the Act and to make it a better tool against govern-
ment fraud. 16 One legislator explained that the amendments sought to provide
a deterrent against fraud by "forcefully discourag[ing] individuals and com-
panies that do business with the United States from engaging in fraudulent
practices."' 17 In order to give the FCA "more teeth", 8 and to make it easier to
News library, Current file. For instance, one psychiatrist was found to have submitted claims
which suggested that he was working over 24 hours a day. Id.
12. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5267. The report indicates that fraud was found in the
procurement of welfare benefits and food stamp benefits, as well as defense contracts. Id.
The Department of Defense testified before Congress that forty-five percent of the one hundred
largest defense contractors, including ninety percent of the ten largest contractors, were under
investigation for multiple fraud charges. Id.
13. The Department of Justice estimated that fraud was draining between 1 and 10 percent
of the Federal Budget. Id. at 5268. It is also important to note that Congress considered the
risk of fraud to go beyond monetary loss. The Senate Report explained:
The cost of fraud cannot always be measured in dollars and cents, however. GAO
pointed out in its 1981 report that fraud erodes public confidence in the Government's
ability to efficiently and effectively manage its programs. Even in the cases where
there is no dollar loss- for example where a defense contractor certifies an untested
part for quality yet there are no apparent defects- the integrity of quality requirements
in procurement programs is seriously undermined. A more dangerous scenario exists
where in the above example the part is defective and causes not only a serious threat to
human life, but also to national security. (footnotes omitted).
Id.
14. 132 CONG. REC. H6479 (Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
15. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, §§ 3, 4, 100 Stat.
3154, 3157 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31). For an in-depth discussion of the
amendments, see S. REP., supra note 4, at 5282-5300. See also Richard J. Oparil, The Coming
Impact of the Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525 (1989).
16. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5266. The Senate Report stated:
Since the act was last amended in 1943, several restrictive court interpretations of the
act have emerged which tend to thwart the effectiveness of the statute. The Committee's
amendments contained in S. 1562 are aimed at correcting restrictive interpretations of
the act's liability standard, burden of proof, qui tam jurisdiction and other provisions
in order to make the False Claims Act a more effective weapon against Government
fraud.
Id. at 5269.
17. 132 CONG. REC. H6480 (Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fish).
18. Andrew W. Singer, The Whistle-Blower: Patriot or Bounty Hunter?, Across The Board,
Nov. 1992, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library (quoting Rep. Berman).
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succeed in a False Claims Act suit,"9 Congress eased the substantive and pro-
cedural burdens on plaintiffs," increased the amount of money recovered in
a favorable judgment, 2' and increased the incentive for qui tam relators to
bring actions.22
One of the more significant, though least discussed 23 of the 1986 amend-
ments, was the amendment that eased the burden of proof required to prove
a false claim by adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard. 24 This
amendment was in response to a split among the circuits of the United States
Courts of Appeals, 25 where some circuits held plaintiffs to a clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard.2 1 In adopting the preponderance standard, the Senate
Committee noted that:
19. 1986 FCA Hearing, supra note 4, at 241 (statement of Frank H. Menaker, Jr., of the
Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc.).
20. This was accomplished by affirmatively stating that there was no scienter requirement
for a false claim, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1988); setting the burden of proof at preponderance of
the evidence, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1988); loosening the statute of limitation by allowing suit
to be brought within three years after the violation becomes known, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)
(1988); and improving the Government's ability to gather information through Civil
Investigative Demands, 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (1988).
21. The civil penalty was increased from double the amount of the damage sustained to
triple the amount. The forfeiture amount was increased from $2,000 to not less than $5,000,
and not more than $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
22. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5288-89 ("The Committee's overall intent in amending the qui
tam section of the False Claims Act is to encourage more private enforcement suits."). The
two major aspects of this change are; raising the percentage of the judgment which the relator
can recover to 15-25% where the Government takes over the suit, and 25-30% where the
relator conducts the action, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1988) and allowing the plaintiff to proceed
with the action even if the Government elects not to pursue the suit, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)
(1988). By increasing the amount of money that a qui tam plaintiff can recover from a suit,
the FCA provides a "marketplace incentive," which "encourages people to protect the
government and the public from waste, fraud and abuse." Singer, supra note 18, at 16 (quoting
Rep. Berman).
23. There is no commentary which specifically, and solely, discusses the burden of proof
requirement of the FCA. For a limited discussion, see Oparil, supra note 15, at 553-54.
24. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1988).
25. Sterling Millwrights, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 49, 95 (1992); S. REP., supra
note 4, at 5296.
26. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1985)
(preponderance); United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983)
(preponderance); United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1979) (clear and
convincing); United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1962) (clear, unequivocal
and convincing); United States v. JT Const. Co., 668 F. Supp. 592, 593 (W.D. Tex. 1987)
(preponderance); Thevenot v. National Flood Ins. Program, 620 F. Supp. 391, 394 (D.C. La.
1985) (preponderance); United States v. Lawson, 522 F. Supp. 746, 750 (D.N.J. 1981) (clear
and convincing); United States v. Klein, 230 F. Supp. 426, 433 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (clear and
convincing), aff'd, 356 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1966); Hageny v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 412,
428 (1978) (clear and convincing).
[Vol. 28:3
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Traditionally, the burden of proof in a civil action is by a preponderance
of the evidence. However, this point is not expressly addressed in the
current act, and the caselaw is fragmented and inconsistent. Inasmuch as
the False Claims Act proceedings are civil and remedial in nature and are
brought to recover compensatory damages, the Committee believes that
the appropriate burden of proof devolving upon the United States in a civil
False Claims Act suit is by a preponderance of the evidence.27
The dilution of the burden of proof under the FCA has indisputably made it
much easier for FCA plaintiffs to succeed.28
By all accounts, it appears that Congress was successful in making the
FCA a more useful tool.2 9 Since the 1986 amendments were enacted, the
number of qui tam suits has risen dramatically, from 12 suits in fiscal year
1987 to 220 suits in fiscal year 1994.30 As a result of this rise in the number
of suits brought the Government had recovered roughly $800 million through
qui tam and whistle-blower litigation by the end of fiscal year 1994. 31 The
Department of Justice reported that it recovered a total of $1.09 billion from
civil fraud litigation in fiscal year 1994 alone.3 2 This dramatic rise in civil
27. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5296.
28. McCormick, supra note 5, at 3 . Professor Kenneth Mann explained:
Because the criminal standard of proof requires a high degree of certainty, prosecutors
often decide not to seek criminal penalties even when convinced of their target's guilt.
Similarly, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, which lies somewhere between
the regular civil standard and the criminal standard, might stop a law enforcement
official from seeking penalties. The amendment adopted the conventional civil standard,
a preponderance of the evidence, thereby facilitating further the sanctioning process.
Mann, supra note 8, at 1850.
29. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1993; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Administrative Practice of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1993) (statement of Sen. Grassley) [hereinafter "1993 FCA Hearings"]. Although the statistics
indicate that the amendments have been useful, critics have argued that the amendments have
simply spawned numerous frivolous lawsuits. James Vicini, Supreme Court Rejects Challenge
To Whistleblower Law, Reuters, Feb. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Current
File. This was one of the arguments used by the Boeing Co. in challenging the constitutionality
of the qui tam provisions in the FCA. Boeing noted that, through 1992, there had been 600
qui tam suits filed since 1986. The False Claims Act, Boeing Asks Supreme Court to Decide
Constitutionality of Qui Tam Provisions, 60 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) at 23, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Current File. Some critics have argued that the Act simply turns disgruntled
employees into bounty hunters, which undermines the internal quality and ethics mechanisms
within the corporations. Singer, supra note 18, at 16.
30. $800 Million Recovered By Government Through Whistle Blower Litigation, 32 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 1408 (Nov. 21, 1994). In the first two months of Fiscal Year 1995,
there had been 12 qui tam actions filed. Id.
31. Id. The Department of Justice reported that in 1991, the recoveries from qui tam
lawsuits had increased 300 percent. Getnick, supra note 9, at 1.
32. $800 Million Recovered By Government Through Whistle Blower Litigation, supra
note 30, at 1408. In the health care fraud area, between Oct. 1, 1993 and March 31, 1994, the
Spring 1995]
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fraud recoveries has been largely the result of the increased damages amounts
in the Act, as well as the lessened burden of proof needed to recover in a false
claim case.
33
Perhaps the greatest impact of the 1986 Amendments will be felt in the
health care area. 34 As of January 9, 1995, some two hundred Pennsylvania
hospitals were sent letters by the Justice Department informing them of po-
tential liability under the civil False Claims Act.3 5 In addition to those hos-
pitals, similar letters are to be sent to about 4,600 other hospitals nationwide,36
claiming that the hospitals have engaged in double billing for diagnostic
tests. 37 These 4,600 hospitals represent roughly 70% of all of the hospitals
nationwide. 38 The letters inform these hospitals that if they do not agree to a
pre-filing settlement, a civil False Claims Act suit will be brought against
them.
39
While the goals behind the civil FCA are certainly sound, this Comment
argues that the means by which the goals are achieved have gone too far. The
1986 Amendments have improved the effectiveness of the FCA in combating
fraud, but unfortunately have done so at the expense of the defendant's due
Government recovered almost $75 million through civil False Claims Act suits and
administrative actions. Report Outlines Recovery of Medicare, Medicaid Fraud, BNA Pens.
& Ben. Daily (June 20, 1994), available in LEXIS, News library, Current file.
33. McCormick, supra note 5, at 3; Earl K. Cantwell, False Claims Act: 1986 Amendments
Spawn Increased New Filings, DEF. COUN. J. 274, 275 (April 1993); Sari Wilson, Midwest,
AM. LAW. at 24 (Oct., 1991); Justice Recovers $257 Million in 1990 Related to Civil Fraud
Cases, 54 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) at 799 (Dec. 3, 1990).
34. Boardman, supra note 8, at 1. In many cities, health care fraud units have been
assembled (some using former counterintelligence agents from the FBI). Roistacher & Cook,
supra note 8, at 6. As these units come on line, the number of actions will increase. Boardman,
supra note 8, at 1.
35. Second Wave of DOJ Letters to Hospitals Due in Two to Three Weeks, BNA Health
Care Daily (Jan. 13, 1995), available in LEXIS, News library, Current file. The letters are all
based on investigations conducted by the Office of Inspector General, of the Department of
Health and Human Services. According to the investigation, these hospitals have been
submitting false claims for diagnostic tests since 1983. Id.
36. David Burda, 4,600 Hospitals Are Targeted in 2nd Medicare Billing Probe, Mod.
Healthcare at 3 (Jan. 2, 1995).
37. Id. Diagnostic test taken within 72 hours of admission are considered part of the
inpatient stay, and reimbursed accordingly. However, hospitals have allegedly been billing
the tests separately from the in-patient stays, resulting in double billing. Id.
38. BNA Health Care Daily, supra note 35.
39. Burda, supra note 36, at 3. The letters state that, "If we do not hear from you, we will
assume you are not interested in a pre-filing settlement and will proceed to file the necessary
legal action in the appropriate United States District Court, through which we will seek the
maximum recovery authorized by law." The hospitals have 20 days to respond. It is expected
that most will settle. Id.
[Vol. 28:3
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process rights.4 The potential effect of this deprivation is obvious in light of
the recent efforts by the Department of Justice. This Comment will focus on
the burden of proof requirement in civil false claims cases, and argue that a
"clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof should be utilized. Part II
will layout the general provisions of the False Claims Act. Part III will delin-
eate the progression of the burden of proof required in civil FCA cases since
its enactment.
Part IV will argue that the forfeiture and civil penalty provisions in the
FCA are punitive. Finally, Part V will contend that the Due Process Clause
requires more than a preponderance of the evidence standard to support im-
position of the civil forfeiture provision of the FCA.
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The purposes of the False Claims Act are to root out fraud,4' punish and
deter those who commit fraud upon the Government, and compensate the
40. Although this Comment will focus exclusively on the False Claims Act, it is important
to note that the use of civil proceedings to exact essentially criminal penalties, without the
attendant procedural protections, is rapidly expanding in many areas of law enforcement.
Professor Mann explained:
While new criminal laws are appearing with great frequency and criminal sentences
are growing more severe, punitive civil sanctions are rapidly expanding, affecting an
increasingly large sector of society in cases brought by private parties as well as by the
government. These sanctions are sometimes more severely punitive than the parallel
criminal sanctions for the same conduct.
Mann, supra note 8, at 1798. These civil penalties, or punitive sanctions, have been enacted
for the purpose of avoiding the procedural requirements of a criminal prosecution, and to
make the penalty a more effective deterrent because of the ease with which it can be imposed.
Jonathon I. Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty
Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 482-83 (1974) ("Civil penalties have been enacted to deny
defendants the protections normally afforded in criminal prosecutions."). Professor Charney
further stated:
The protections granted to defendants in criminal actions impose burdens on the
prosecutor which are not borne by the plaintiff in civil litigation. To escape these
burdens, legislators and prosecutors have tried to devise various methods of
circumventing the requirements of providing constitutional protections to criminal
defendants. One increasingly popular technique to avoid this duty is to change the
labels of the statutes under which individuals are prosecuted from criminal to civil.
Id. at 480. The False Claims Act, therefore, should not be viewed as an anomaly. It is one of
many statutes which have sought to improve the government's position through the use of
civil penalties. Many of the arguments made in the context of the FCA can also be made with
respect to other statutes. See, e.g., Christopher M. Maine, Comment, The Standard of Proof
in Civil RICO Actions for Treble Damages: Why the Clear and Convincing Standard Should
Apply, 22 IND. L. REV. 881 (1989).
41. Erickson v. American Inst. of Bio. Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 915 (E.D. Va. 1989)
Spring 19951
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Government for that fraud. 42 Generally, the FCA has been broadly construed
to apply to any type of fraudulent claim.43 Under the False Claims Act, a
person is liable for a false claim if he, among other things, knowingly presents,
makes, uses, or causes to be presented, made or used, a false record or state-
ment, which causes the federal government to pay money to that person.4 4 A
False Claims Act suit can be brought in one of two ways. First, the Attorney
General may file a lawsuit in a federal district court.4 5 Second, a private citi-
zen may file a qui tam46 lawsuit in a federal district court on behalf of the
United States.4 7 If a private citizen initiates a False Claims Act suit, she is
(referring to the qui tam provisions); 140 CONG. REC. S15052 (Oct. 8, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Deconcini) ("The FCA was meant to address 'fraud against the Government."').
42. United States v. Burton, 132 B.R. 968 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (In re Selma Apparel Corp.).
43. Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1957); United States v. Truong, 860 F.
Supp. 1137, 1139 (E.D. La. 1994).
44. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). Section 3729 of the FCA provides:
(a) Liability For Certain Acts- Any person who-
(I) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the
United States or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to
get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed
or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of public property or money used, or to be used,
by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to conceal
the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for
which the person receives a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to
be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers
the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property
from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces who
lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or
(7) knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government.
45. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (1988).
46. Qui tam is derived from the latin phrase "qui tam pro domine rege quam pro sic ipso
in hoc parte sequitur," or "who as well for the king for himself sues in the matter." In this
situation, the person filing the suit is referred to as the "relator". The purpose of the qui tam
provision is to encourage private citizens to report fraud to the government. Mortgages, Inc.
v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 934 F.2d 209, 210 (9th Cir. 1991).
47. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1988). The qui tam provisions of the FCA have been the most
[Vol. 28:3
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entitled to receive a portion of the recovery. 4 8
A wide range of misconduct is proscribed by the False Claims Act, such
as the submission of fraudulent invoices for repayment under a federally
funded program, 49 and the submission of false information to the federal
government in order to obtain a government loan.5" A "claim" under the FCA
encompasses all demands or requests which lead to disbursement of federal
controversial. See supra note 29. In 1943, Congress became disgruntled with what they
considered parasitic lawsuits, and barred private parties from bringing a qui tam action based
on information which the Government possessed at the time the suit was brought. The 1943
Amendment was largely brought on by the Supreme Court case of United States ex re. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), which held that a qui tam suit could be brought by anyone,
regardless of the origin of their information, if it advanced the purposes of the FCA. This
prospect caused many to call for the elimination of qui tam suits entirely, however a
compromise was forged which kept the action but severely limited it. Oparil, supra note 15
at 535. This jurisdictional bar severely limited the ability of private parties to use the qui tam
mechanism, and substantially weakened the FCA. See F. Paul Bland, Why "Qui Tam" Is
Necessary, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1991, at 13 (arguing that the False Claims Act had become
"toothless" since the 1943 Amendments).
The 1986 Amendments cleared up the problems which plagued the qui tam provision in
1943 by barring suits based on information obtained from an ongoing civil suit by the
Government, or information gained from criminal proceedings, public hearings, the media,
etc. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (1988). After the 1986 Amendments, there was some question as to
whether a government employee could be a relator. Some courts have held that government
employees did have standing to bring a False Claims Act suit. See U.S. ex rel. LeBlanc v.
Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 18 cert. denied 499 U.S. 921 (1991); United States v. CAC-
Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1990); aff'd, 963 F.2d 384 (1 1th Cir. 1992). The
rationale of these cases was that Congress explicitly delineated those persons who could not
bring suit, and because government employees were not listed, they were eligible. Robert L.
Vogel, Citizens' Lawsuits Based on the False Claims Act Have Multiplied; Private Suits
Under False Claims Act on Rise, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 20, 21. There has been some
action, however, to bar government employees from initiating False Claims Act suits. Assistant
Attorney General Stuart Gerson explained:
We simply must preclude: inherent conflicts of interest among federal employees that
the potential of large qui tam rewards would create; the incentive for Government
employees assigned to investigations to understate the significance of the cases that
they are working on in the hope that the Government will not follow up, leaving the
way open for a qui tam case; morale problems in Government service among employees
assigned to non-fraud investigations or smaller dollar value investigations; and the
misallocation of Government resources through individual decisions by Government
employees to spend official time on cases they hope could lead to potential personal
recoveries rather than on assigned duties.
1993 FCA Hearings, supra note 29, at 75 (statement of Charles F.C. Ruff, of the Aerospace
Industries Association of America).
48. If the lawsuit is taken over by the Government, the relator will recover between 15%
and 25% of the award. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (1988). If the Government declines to take
the case, and the relator continues to pursue it, the relator will recover between 25% and 30%
of the award. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988).
49. United States v. O'Connell, 890 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1989).
50. United States v. Entin, 750 F. Supp. 512 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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funds.5 1 Section 3729 of the Act was amended to clarify the term "claim"
because some courts had held that once the federal government gives funds
to a state or local actor, it relinquishes control of the funds and may not uti-
lize the FCA.5 2 Essentially, Congress intended the FCA to reach "all types of
fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Govern-
ment." 5
A claim may be "false or fraudulent" in many situations. For example,
a farmer may understate the yield of his crop in order to receive crop insur-
ance indemnity payments, 54 or a federal contractor may inflate subcontractors'
price quotes on a job in which there is no bidding. 55 A false or fraudulent
claim becomes grounds for a suit when it is made knowingly. 6 A "know-
ingly" made false claim will exist when the person has actual knowledge of
the falsity of the information, or acts in reckless disregard or deliberate igno-
rance of the truth or falsity of the information.5 7 If a violation of the False
51. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c). A "claim" is defined as:
... any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property
which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government
provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if
the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any
portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.
52. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5286. See United States v. Azzarelli Construction Co., 647
F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1981) (bid-rigging in highway construction); United States ex rel. Salzman
v. Salant and Salant, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (fraud against the Red Cross).
The clarification was deemed necessary to ensure that frauds committed against State and
local agencies, acting as intermediaries for the Federal Government, were prosecuted. S.
REP., supra note 4, at 5287. (States may not have sufficient remedies or investigative resources
to adequately prosecute fraud). The Senate Committee believed that whenever Federal funds
are used, regardless of who controls the outlay of the money, the Federal Government still
retains the power to assure that the funds are being utilized appropriately. Id. In support of
its position, the Committee pointed to the caselaw in the area of Medicare and Medicaid
fraud. Under Medicare and Medicaid, the false claims are not made directly to the Federal
Government. Rather, the claims are made to an insurance company or another intermediary,
who is then reimbursed by the Federal Government. Courts have consistently held that this
type of activity falls within the FCA. See, e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45 (5th
Cir.) (Medicaid), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); United States ex rel. Davis, Long's
Drugs, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (Medicaid).
53. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5284 (quoting United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S.
228 (1968)).
54. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1985).
55. United States v. JT Const. Co., 668 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
56. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
57. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1988). The FCA provides:
(b) Knowing and Knowingly Defined - For purposes of this section, the terms
"knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to information -
(1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the
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Claims Act is proven, a civil penalty of three times the damage sustained by
the Government is assessed, as well as a forfeiture of no less than $5,000, and
no more than $10,000, per false claim. 58
The procedure by which a False Claims Act suit is brought depends upon
who is bringing the suit. If the Attorney General is bringing the suit, the stan-
dard procedures are followed. However, if a relator is initiating the lawsuit,
special procedures are employed. First, the complaint is filed under seal, and
in camera, with the court, and must remain so for at least sixty days. 59 Sec-
ond, a copy of the complaint must be served on the Government,60 at which
time the Government may choose to proceed with the action6 or decline to
truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.
Subsection (b) was added to Section 3729 in response to conflicting interpretations of
constructive knowledge under the Act. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5285. See, e.g., United
States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply, 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bouchet,
No. 85 Civ. 8530, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4090 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). One of the main reasons
for clarifying the liability standard was to assure that people could not insulate themselves
from liability by intentional ignorance 132 CONG. REC. S 11243 (Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Grassley). The clarified standard would make a person liable for recklessly acting in
disregard of the truth or for deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the claim. Id.
Beside the addition of subsection (a)(7), the pre-1986 FCA was identical with respect to
the liability standard. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). If there is more than one defendant, each one is joint and
severally liable for the treble damages and forfeiture. Mortgages, Inc. v. United States Dist.
Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 934 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1991). Congress retained the automatic
forfeiture provision of the original Act (the $5,000 to $10,000 penalty), because it felt that
"defrauding the Government is serious enough to warrant automatic forfeiture rather than
leaving fine determinations with district courts, possibly resulting in discretionary nominal
payments." S. REP., supra note 4, at 5282. The damages provisions of the FCA had remained
unchanged since the original enactment of the FCA. Id. Under the original FCA, the
Government was permitted to recover double the amount of the damages sustained, plus a
$2,000 forfeiture per false claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982). Proponents of the amendments
believed that an increase in the penalty and forfeiture provisions of the Act would enhance
the deterrent effect of the FCA, and also to signal that the Government is serious about
stopping fraud. 1986 FCA Hearing, supra note 4, at I (statement of Sen. Grassley).
59. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988). The Government can extend the sixty days by a
showing of "good cause". 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (1988). "Good cause" was not intended to
cover situations were the Justice Department was simply overburdened and did not get to the
complaint, but was intended to apply in situations such as when a criminal investigation is
pending S. REP., supra note 4, at 5290. A pending criminal investigation, however, is not
meant to act as a per se bar to a private suit. Id.
60. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988). The Justice Department has shown concern that the
private initiation of FCA suits may interfere with ongoing criminal investigations by "tipping-
off" the defendant. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5289. The sixty day provision, as well as the
requirement that the complaint be filed under seal, were intended to allow the Government to
evaluate the relator's case, and determine if it conflicted with investigations already underway.
Id.
61. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(A) (1988).
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proceed. 62 If the Government chooses to proceed with the action, it retains
primary responsibility for the lawsuit. 63 If the Government declines to pro-
ceed with the lawsuit, the relator may continue to prosecute the case. 64 Fi-
nally, the defendant is not served the complaint until the Government makes
its determination, and the court orders service. 65 At this point, the lawsuit will
begin.
III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN FCA CASES PRIOR TO THE
1986 AMENDMENTS
The question of what burden of proof was appropriate under the False
Claims Act was initially answered in United States v. Shapleigh.66 The suit
in Shapleigh was based on 146 counts of receiving payment by vouchers for
work which was not performed. 67 The suit was brought on the grounds that
the defendant's conduct violated Section 3490 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States (1878).68
62. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (1988).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1988). If the Government takes over the suit, the relator may
still participate. Id. However, the relator's participation may be limited if the court finds
that their participation would "interfere or unduly delay the Government's prosecution of the
case," is for the purpose of harassment, or would cause the defendant "undue burden or
expense." 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(c)(2)(C), (D) (1988). Further, the Government may dismiss or
settle the suit over the objection of the relator, so long as the relator was given the opportunity
to be heard. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(c)(2)(A), (B) (1988).
64. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1988).
65. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988). The defendant has 20 days following service to respond
to the complaint. Id. The Senate Committee believed that the filing of the qui tam suit
should be treated as if the relator had simply asked the Government to review the case. S.
REP., supra note 4, at 5289.
66. 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1893).
67. Id. at 127.
68. Section 3490 provides:
Sec. 3490. Any person not in the military or naval forces of the United States, or in the
militia called into or actually employed in the service of the United States, who shall
do or commit any of the acts prohibited by any of the provisions of section fifty-four
hundred and thirty eight, title "Crimes," shall forfeit and pay to the United States the
sum of two thousand dollars, and, in addition, double the amount of damages which
the United States may have sustained by reason of the doing or committing of such act,
together with the costs of suit; and such forfeitures and damages shall be sued for in
the same suit.
Section 5438 of the Revised Statutes established the standard for liability, and provided:
Sec. 5438. Every person who makes or causes to be made, or who presents or causes
to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil,
military, or naval service of the United States, any claim upon or against the government
of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be
false fictitious, or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain
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The court held that in a False Claims Act suit brought under sections
5438 and 3490, the Government was required to prove its civil case beyond
a reasonable doubt. 69 The court reasoned that because the Government sought
damages in excess of the loss it sustained, and it relied on the commission of
felonies to justify the action, the proceeding was criminal in nature and re-
quired the highest burden of proof.7" The court explained:
The United States might have maintained a civil suit for the single dam-
ages it sustained, if any, from the wrongful acts of the defendant charged
in this complaint without establishing its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such a suit would have been a civil suit in its nature and purpose as well
as in its form. The action at bar is a civil suit in form; but when, under the
form of a civil suit, the government sought to punish this defendant for
felonies by recovering the penalty of double damages and $2,000 for each
offense, it made this proceeding criminal in its nature and purpose, and
invoked the application to it of the rules of evidence applicable to crimi-
nal trials.7'
The holding in Shapleigh has never been explicitly overruled,7 2 however, no
court has applied this standard in a FCA action since Shapleigh.
In the years immediately preceding the 1986 Amendments, the courts
were split regarding the burden of proof required under the False Claims Act.7 3
Several courts required plaintiffs to prove their case by clear and convincing
evidence. These courts provided two rationales for this requirement. First,
the payment or approval of such claims, makes, uses, or causes to be made or used,
any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition,
knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, . . . shall
be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than five years, or fined not
less than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars.
These provision of the Revised Statutes of 1878 are available in Shapleigh, 54 F. at 126-27.
69. Id. at 130.
70. id.
71. Id. at 134.
72. Most courts have distinguished Shapleigh on the grounds that the FCA is not a penal
statute, and thus does not call for a criminal burden of proof. See United States v. Ueber, 299
F.2d 310, 315 (6th Cir. 1962).
73. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1985)
(preponderance); United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983)
(preponderance); United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1979) (clear and
convincing); United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1962) (clear, unequivocal
and convincing); United States v. JT Const. Co., 668 F. Supp. 592, 593 (W.D. Tex. 1987)
(preponderance); Thevenot v. National Flood Ins. Program, 620 F. Supp. 391, 394 (D.C. La.
1985) (preponderance); United States v. Lawson, 522 F. Supp. 746, 750 (D.N.J. 1981) (clear
and convincing); United States v. Klein, 230 F. Supp. 426, 433 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (clear and
convincing), aff'd, 356 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1966); Hageny v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 412,
428 (1978) (clear and convincing).
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some courts found that because the "gravamen" of the statute was fraud,74 the
FCA plaintiff should be held to the burden of proof required in common law
fraud suits. 75 For example, the Sixth Circuit, quoting Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc. of the United States v. Johnson,7 6 stated:
Fraud is not to be presumed and the burden of establishing it was upon
appellees. They were not required to establish it beyond a reasonable
doubt, but something more is required than the mere weight, or prepon-
derance, of the evidence. It is essential that the evidence should be clear,
unequivocal, and convincing. 77
The second rationale provided was that the False Claims Act is penal in
nature and therefore requires a heightened burden of proof. The clearest
example of this rationale was forwarded by the court in United States v.
Klein.7" The court cited the Supreme Court cases of United States v.
McNinch79 and United States v. Rainwater,"° which pointed out that the civil
portion of the FCA was grounded upon the criminal liability test, which
showed that the Act had a penal quality to it.8 This penal quality evidenced
that the action was based on fraud.8" Although the court acknowledged that
the Supreme Court had expressly noted that the FCA was not penal, it still
found that the action was based on fraud, and hence required clear and con-
vincing evidence.
83
On the other hand, several courts have held that a False Claims Act plain-
tiff must prove his case by only a preponderance of the evidence. 4 Unfortu-
74. United States v. Ekelman & Associates, 532 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1962); Hageny v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 412,
428 (1978). See United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 232-33 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
civil action under the FCA requires an intent to defraud).
75. Ueber, 299 F.2d at 315. The court stated it did not believe that "because this case
involves a statutory cause of action under the False Claims Act, the government is relieved
from meeting the burden applicable to any fraud action, statutory or common law." Id.
76. 81 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1936).
77. Ueber, 299 F.2d at 314-15.
78. 230 F. Supp. 426, 431 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 356 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1966).
79. 356 U.S. 595, 598 (1958).
80. 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958) ("In reaching our conclusion, we are aware that the civil
portion of the Act incorporates, as a test of liability, the provisions of the criminal section as
they were set out in § 5438 of the Revised Statute of 1878 . .
81. Klein, 230 F. Supp. at 431.
82. Id. ("It is because of this background of the criminal or penal nature of the action that it
has been held that a cause of action under the False Claims Act is grounded in fraud, and
therefore, the standard of proof necessary to be applied to establish liability under the Act
must be by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.").
83. Id. at 432-33.
84. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1985); United States
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nately, many of the courts which have adopted this burden of proof have not
given much explanation as to why this standard was chosen. 8 The court in
Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, however, provided a rationale for the lesser
burden of proof.16 The court explained:
Further, although we need not reach this point in view of our holding that
the district court's instruction was not plain error, we think the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard is appropriate under the Act. Courts that
have chosen the clear and convincing standard have done so for one pri-
mary reason: that the "gravamen" of a False Claims Act suit is "intentional
fraud and misrepresentation. This court has held, however, that the Act
covers not only fraudulent claims based on intentional misrepresentations,
but false claims based on negligent misrepresentations as well. Because
fraud need not be an element of an action under the Act, the rationale of
these courts, that fraud requires a higher standard of proof, is eroded.87
(citations omitted)
The court also rejected the argument that the FCA is penal in nature.8 This
case became the primary support for Congress' amendment of the burden of
proof requirement in 1986.9
IV. THE DAMAGES PROVISIONS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
ARE PUNITIVE
A. The Current View of the Nature of the False Claims Act
Proponents of the False Claims Act have defended the damage provi-
sions of the Act as being remedial in nature. 90 During the House Hearings on
v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. JT Const. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 592, 593 (W.D. Tex. 1987); Thevenot v. National Flood Ins. Program, 620 F. Supp.
391, 394 (D.C. La. 1985).
85. See, e.g., Thomas, 709 F.2d at 971-72; JT Const. Co., 668 F. Supp. at 593; Thevenot,
620 F. Supp. at 394.
86. Hester, 765 F.2d at 727-28.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 728. The court stated:
Nor are we persuaded by Hester's argument that a clear and convincing standard is
required because the double damages and forfeiture provisions are punitive. The
Supreme Court in United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess, [held] that an action under the
Act retains its civil nature despite these provisions. Because the Act neither requires a
showing of intent nor is punitive in nature, we find no justification for applying a
burden of proof higher than a preponderance of evidence. (citation omitted)
89. See S. REP., supra note 4, at 5296.
90. See 132 CONG. REC. H6480 (Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fish); 1986 FCA Hearing,
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the 1986 Amendments, Rep. Fish began his statements by stressing that:
.... we are dealing here with a civil - not a criminal - statute. The False
Claims Act is remedial in nature. As it is now constituted, the False
Claims Act does not contain any criminal sanctions and these legislative
proposals do not contain any criminal provisions.9'
Although the Act calls for treble damages, plus the forfeiture, proponents state
that these additional damages are necessary to fully compensate the govern-
ment for its loss.9 2
The position that the damage provisions of the False Claims Act are
remedial and not punitive is supported by the Supreme Court's 1943 decision
in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.9 3 In Hess, the defendants were in-
dicted and convicted of collusive bidding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 88.9 4
Subsequent to that criminal proceeding, the Government brought a civil ac-
tion under the False Claims Act.95 The defendants argued that this subsequent
action was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.96
The Court held that this action was not barred because the civil proceeding
was remedial in nature, and did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.9 7 The Court explained:
It is true that "Punishment, in a certain and very limited sense, may be the
result of the statute before us so far as the wrong-doer is concerned," but
this is not enough to label it a criminal statute. We think the chief purpose
of the statutes here was to provide for restitution to the government of
money taken from it by fraud, and that the device of double damages plus
supra note 4, at 17 (statement of Jay. B. Stephens, Dep. Assoc. Attorney General) ("This is a
civil remedy. As a civil remedy, it is designed to make the Government whole for the losses
it has suffered ... ").
91. 1986 FCA Hearing, supra note 4, at 102. Interestingly, Rep. Fish's statement, as well
as all of the other House statement, assumed that the damage provision would require only
double damages, not the treble damages ultimately passed.
92. 1986 FCA Hearing, supra note 4, at 147 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division) ("Because of the deceptive and concealed nature of fraud,
the government will rarely be able to prove the entirety of its loss. Thus by establishing a
form of 'liquidated damages,' this provision [double damages] insures that the government
will be made whole."). See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943)
("We cannot say that the remedy now before us requiring payment of a lump sum and double
damages will do more than afford the government complete indemnity for the injuries done
it.").
93. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
94. Id. at 548.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97. Id. at 549.
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a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be
made completely whole.98 (citation omitted)
This case has been extensively utilized to support the remedial nature of the
False Claims Act.
In 1989, however, the effect of Hess was substantially weakened by the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Halper.9 9 In Halper, the defen-
dant was convicted of 65 counts of submitting false Medicare claims for re-
imbursement, in violation of the criminal portion of the FCA.'0 0 Once again,
subsequent to the criminal conviction, the Government brought a civil suit
based on the same 65 counts.' 0' The defendant was found liable for double the
amount of the actual damages sustained, which equaled $585, the cost of
investigating and prosecuting the case, and $130,000 in forfeiture. 10 2 The
district court found that the forfeiture bore "no rational relation" to the
Government's actual loss, and held that it was punishment in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 0 3 Upon direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed
the district court. 0 4
In finding that the particular award was punishment, the Court noted that
civil penalties may rise to the level of punishment. 10 5 In order to determine if
a sanction is punitive in nature, the Court placed little importance on the civil
label of the proceeding, and focused on the "purposes actually served by the
sanction."'' 0 6 Accordingly, the Court held that where a civil sanction is "so
extreme and so divorced from the Government's damages and expenses," 10 7
such that the sanction can only be said to serve the purposes of retribution and
deterrence, it is punishment. 08
98. Id. at 551-52.
99. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 438.
102. Id. at 439.
103. Id. at 438-39 (1989).
104. Id. at 452.
105. Id. at 441-42.
106. Id. at 447. The Court stated that "in determining whether a particular civil sanction
constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in question,
not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated."
Id. at 447, n.7. See also Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988).
107. Halper, 490 U.S. at 442.
108. Id. at 448. The Court explained:
We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves the twin aims of
retribution and deterrence. Furthermore, "[r]etribution and deterrence are not
legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives." From these premises, it follows
that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
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Although Halper stands for the proposition that the civil penalty and
forfeiture provisions in the FCA can be punitive in nature, the Court's hold-
ing was limited to the context of double jeopardy. First, the Court declined
to deviate from the general notion that double damages plus a fixed penalty
generally serve a remedial purpose. 109 Rather, the Court simply held that in
"1rare cases" the sanction may exceed the remedial goal. 110 Hence, the role of
the court is to evaluate each case in order to determine whether the award is
commensurate with the actual loss."' Further, the Court stated that its deci-
sion did not preclude the Government from seeking the full civil penalty in a
civil case, so long as there was no prior criminal proceeding.' 2 Therefore,
while the rationale in Halper supports the proposition that the sanctions in the
False Claims Act should be viewed as punitive, the effect of the decision is
severely eroded by its express limitations.' 1
3
B. The False Claims Act Is Punitive
The current defense of the False Claims Act as remedial is consistent
with the approach of viewing money sanctions as "rough compensation". 11
The approach shown by the Supreme Court evidences a desire to utilize this
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes,
is punishment as we have come to understand the term. (citations omitted)
109. Id. at 446 ("the Government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is it may demand
compensation according to somewhat imperfect formulas, such as reasonable liquidated
damages or a fixed sum plus double damages .... ).
110. Id. at 449 ("What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case such as the one
before us, where a fixed penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a
sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused.").
111. Id. at 450. The remedy available to the district judge is to reduce the amount of the
award, in order to bring in line with the damage suffered.
112. Id. The Court also noted that the Government could seek both the civil remedy and
the criminal penalty in a single proceeding without offending the double jeopardy clause. Id.
113. Mann,, supra note 8, at 1842 ("Halper goes only part of the way toward accepting the
punitive function of more-than-compensatory money sanctions.").
114. Id. at 1823. Professor Mann notes:
The third approach, which I call the compensatory approach, views money sanctions
as "rough compensation" rather than punishment. The money sanction is understood
as a means to repay the government for the cost of enforcing the law. The idea that
the sanction is technically more than compensatory does not prevent courts from
finding an essentially compensatory arrangement. To explain how multiple damage
sanctions often found in penal statutes can be considered compensatory, the courts
have sometimes used the term "liquidated damages," referring to the parallel contract
remedy that retains the idea of compensation in a regime of more-than-simple
damages.
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type of rhetoric to sustain civil penalties which it deems appropriate, without
being required to provide procedural protection in light of their obvious pu-
nitive nature. 1 5 The penalty provisions of the False Claims Act, however, are
clearly punitive, and go well beyond serving a remedial function. 16
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that deterrence and retribution are
not appropriate functions in a non-punitive setting." 7 The forfeiture provision
in the Act, however, serves nothing but a deterrent and retributive function.
At no time during the hearings or debates on the 1986 Amendments was it
suggested that the current damage structure failed to fully compensate the
Government in suits which it brought. The apparent question was whether
the current structure provided a substantial enough deterrent." 8 Although
proponents of the Act continually decry the penal nature of the Act, they are
quick to point out its deterrent and retributive qualities.1 9 According to one
Congressman, "the dual purpose of any such law should always be to deter as
well as punish fraudulent conduct." 2 0
115. Id. at 1820-30. Professor Mann stated further:
Mitchell and Marcus became part of a broader dynamic that transformed the term
"remedial" into a catch-all label for sanctions that courts did not want to define as
punitive in the criminal sense, but that were clearly not simple compensatory damages.
By referring to money sanctions as remedial, the Court could approve the use of
civil procedures to impose sanctions designed to punish wrongdoers and could send
a deterrent message to the community. By finding civil implications in a statute that
certainly had punitive meaning for legislators, administrators, and the public, the
Court made deft use of a legal fiction to facilitate and legitimate the increased use of
punitive sanctions.
Id. at 1829-30.
116. See id. at 1798.
117. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 433, 448 (1989); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
539, n.20 (1979); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
118. 1986 FCA Hearing, supra note 4, at 104 (statement of Rep. Fish) ("I defer to the
expertise of the Members of this Subcommittee as to whether or not the double damage
remedy contained in the current law provides a sufficient deterrent."). The Department of
Justice was highly cautious about raising the damages to treble damages plus a $10,000 per
claim forfeiture. Assistant Attorney General Willard stated:
However, this crucial principle - that a civil False Claims Act prosecution is
remedial and not punitive - may be jeopardized by proposals to increase greatly
the penalties which may be recovered. We have found that where judges perceive
the penalties which may be assessed under the Act to be grossly disproportionate to
the wrongdoing, they will rule against the government outright or subtly engraft
criminal standards and procedural hurdles onto the civil portion of the Act.
Consequently, we are very concerned about the proposals contained in some bills,
notably H.R. 3317 and H.R. 3753, as well as S. 1562, to move to treble damages and
a $10,000 forfeiture.
Id. at 128-29 (statement of Richard K. Willard).
119. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. at H6480 (statement of Rep. Fish).
120. Id.
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Further, it is difficult to see how the treble damages provision, plus the
provision for payment of investigative and litigation costs, 2 1 is not sufficient
to allow for full recovery. 122 One commentator explained:
While the United States should recover fully for any damage it may suf-
fer because of a false claim, the treble damages provision of the FCA are
intended to ensure such recovery. The penalty provisions are intended to
deter fraudulent conduct, especially when actual damages would be nomi-
nal. Where actual damages are not nominal, the trebling of those damages
deters as well as compensates, with the result that the deterrence is mul-
tiplied without any consideration of the impact of such multiplied deter-
rence.... 
123
That the civil penalties and forfeitures substantially exceed the actual loss
suffered by the Government is shown by the Department of Justice's settle-
ment strategy with the 4,600 hospitals recently notified of potential liability.
The settlements proposed by the DOJ calculate out to approximately one times
the amount overpaid by the Government. 2 4 These settlement proposals,
which are far below the potential award in a court action,' 25 indicate that the
Government does not need treble damages, let alone a $5,000 to $10,000
forfeiture per false claim, to fully compensate it.126 In this light, it becomes
apparent that the forfeiture provisions of the FCA serve little more than a
deterrent or retributive function.
27
121. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
122. The Justice Department did not believe that treble damages plus the forfeiture were
needed for compensation, and stated that "double damages plus a $5,000-per-claim penalty is
more appropriate and consistent with the fundamental purpose of the statute." 1986 FCA
Hearing, supra note 4, at 129 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division).
123. 1993 FCA Hearing, supra note 29, at 62 (statement of Rand L. Allen, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce).
124. Nearly 4,600 Hospitals Face Civil Prosecution For Medicare Claims, 22 BNA PENS.
& BEN. REP. at 25 (Jan. 2, 1995) [hereinafter "Civil Prosecution for Medicare"].
125. Id. The average overpayments for each hospital total in the tens of thousands. The
liability faced by each hospital typically is in the millions of dollars. Burda, supra note 36, at
3. For example, one hospital is being allowed to settle its case for $45,000, although its
potential liability could be $3.4 million. Civil Prosecution for Medicare, supra note 124, at
25. The rationale presented by the Government for the low settlement figures is that it is
"more interested in correcting future problems than penalizing past behavior." Hospitals
which settle will be required to establish self audit procedures. Burda, supra note 36, at 3. If
this explanation is accurate, it clearly shows that the use of the forfeiture and treble damages
provisions of the FCA are primarily used for "penalizing past behavior," and would thus be
punitive.
126. Burda, supra note 36, at 3 (due to the forfeiture provisions the potential liability
greatly exceeds the amount of actual loss).
127. The discrepancy between the actual loss and the potential loss also serves to force
defendants to settle, so that they can avoid a potentially devastating judgment. Id.
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While the Supreme Court has upheld similar treble damages-plus-fixed-
penalty provisions, 28 these cases appear firmly rooted in the disarming rheto-
ric of "rough justice", and bear little relation to the actual effect and purpose
of the sanction. The Court in Halper clearly noted that when a civil sanction
"cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only
be explained as also serving either a retributive or deterrent purposes," it is
punitive. 129 When the actual purpose and effect of the FCA is examined, 3 °
the forfeiture provisions of the Act are clearly aimed solely at deterrence and
retribution, and are not necessary to make the Government whole.
The situation faced in Halper, which the Court considered punitive, is
not as rare as the Court believes. 131 One Assistant United States Attorney
illustrated how the Act functions in the area of health care. 13 2 He described
a case in which a doctor submitted 3000 false claims, causing the Government
$130,000 in actual damages. 3 3 When the mandatory forfeiture was included,
the doctor was held liable for $19 million, or roughly 150 times the amount
of the actual damage. 3 4 In response to this case, the Assistant U.S. Attorney
stated, "It's a very draconian statute; we prosecutors love it."' 3 5 This type of
result is not limited to health care, but also occurs in the case of contractors.136
As one example of the numerous "horror stories," Rand L. Allen, who repre-
sented the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, told of a construction contractor who
violated Department of Labor regulations in running an employee training
program. 13 The contractor was held liable for a multimillion dollarjudgment,
even though the actual loss to the Government was only $14,000.138
These types of situations occur because it is possible to be held liable for
multiple false claims. The Supreme Court has held that liability can be placed
128. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983) (securities fraud).
129. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 433, 448 (1989).
130. Id. at 447, n. 7.
131. Id. at 449.
132. McCormick, supra note 5, at 3. The Assistant U.S. Attorney was James Sheehan,
chief of the civil division for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Philadelphia, Pa.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Further examples of the potential for outrageously excessive awards in the health
care area can be found in the DOJ's current efforts against hospitals. One hospital under
investigation caused a loss of $45,000, but faced a total liability of $3.4 million. Another
hospital would face a forfeiture on 898 individual claims. Civil Prosecution for Medicare,
supra note 124, at 25.
136. 1993 FCA Hearing, supra note 29, at 58 (statement of Rand L. Allen, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce).
137. Id.
138. Id.
21
LaSalle: The Civil False Claims Act
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAW REVIEW
on each act which leads to a false claim. 3 9 As one commentator noted, "the
government may use the FCA and obtain windfall damages, especially since
its litigation costs are paid by the unsuccessful defendant."' 40 Because of the
way "claims" are defined, the penalty assessed for each claim bears no rela-
tion to the loss caused by each claim, and hence bears no rational relation to
the objective of compensation. 4' The number of false claims can easily rise
to levels where the forfeiture will overwhelmingly exceed the amount neces-
sary to compensate the Government. 42
In this light it becomes quite apparent that the forfeiture provisions of the
False Claims Act are punitive in nature, despite the contrary findings of the
courts. The forfeitures are not necessary for compensatory purposes, and only
serve as deterrence and retribution. This fact is clearly evidenced by the
numerous cases where the forfeiture awards have been in extreme dispropor-
tion to the actual damages sustained. 143
V. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A BURDEN OF PROOF OF CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no per-
son shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."' 44 The Due Process Clause has been held to have both a substantive145
139. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
140. Oparil, supra note 15, at 557.
141. 1993 FCA Hearing, supra note 29, at 58 (statement of Rand L. Allen, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce) ("For example, when the basis of an FCA suit is an error in an overhead
account, each invoice submitted by a contractor under every open contract is can be classified
as a 'false claim,' which the result is that potentially hundreds of contracts, thousands of
claims and millions of dollars may be in issue even though actual damages are far less.").
142. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dean v. Wisconsin, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984) (900
false claims).
143. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment similarly provides that no State
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, c. 1.
145. See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994) ("[Tihe words 'by the law of the
land' from the Magna Carta were 'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government."' (citation omitted)); Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993)
(determining the constitutionality of a Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation
which allows deportation of juvenile illegal aliens) ; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2804 (1992) ("[T]he guaranties of due process, though having their roots in Magna
Carta's 'per legem terrae' and considered as procedural safeguards 'against executive
usurpation and tyranny,' have in this country 'become bulwarks also against arbitrary
legislation." (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961)(Harlan J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 28:3
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 3, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss3/9
THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT
and a procedural component.'4 6 Substantive due process precludes the gov-
ernment from infringing upon certain "fundamental" liberties, regardless of
the process provided, unless there is a compelling state interest and the in-
fringement is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.141 Its purpose is to "pre-
vent governmental power from being 'used for purposes of oppression." 
4 8
The interests protected by substantive due process have generally been lim-
ited to marriage, family, procreation and the right to bodily integrity.'4 9 The
Court has been extremely reluctant to extend protection beyond these areas.'
50
Procedural due process, the component of the Due process Clause impli-
146. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-82 (1990)
(discussing procedural due process implications of clear and convincing evidence standard in
proceedings to remove someone from life support); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986) (determining whether an injury caused by a negligent act constitutes a deprivation);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)
(holding that procedural due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases).
147. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447 ("Respondents' 'substantive due process' claim relies upon
our line of cases which interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of 'due
process of law' to include a substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe
certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.").
148. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331-2 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856)).
149. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 812. Freedom from bodily restraint is at the core of substantive
due process. Justice O'Connor explained in Flores:
"Freedom from bodily restraint" means more than freedom from handcuffs,
straitjackets, or detention cells. A person's core liberty interest is also implicated
when she is confined in a prison, a mental hospital, or some other form of custodial
institution, even if the conditions of confinement are liberal.
Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 812. The Court has been hesitant to expand protection beyond
these areas because "the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are
scarce and open-ended." Id. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe, commented:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its contents cannot be determined
by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this
Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not
been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might
take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country,
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as
well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision
of this Court which radically departs from it could no long survive, while a decision
which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as
a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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cated by the False Claims Act, protects the individual from arbitrary govern-
mental action.'15 The purpose behind this aspect of due process is to promote
fairness in decisions regarding interests in life, liberty, or property. 52 Proce-
dural due process differs substantially from substantive due process in that the
actual deprivation does not constitute an abuse of governmental power.'53
Justice Stevens, concurring in Daniels v. Williams, explained that "[iun a
procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty
that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty without due
process of law - without adequate procedures."'' 5 4 The essential requirement
of procedural due process is the right to be heard "at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner."'
' 55
Procedural due process analysis seeks to determine whether the govern-
ment has provided sufficient procedural protections against erroneously or
arbitrarily depriving a person of their life, liberty, or property.'5 6 In order to
sustain a procedural due process attack, it must be shown that a deprivation
of a liberty interest existed, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and
that the procedures utilized in that deprivation were not adequate. 5 7 Once a
liberty or property interest is found, the test delineated in Mathews v. Eldridge
is used to determine the adequacy of the procedures which were utilized.'58 In
Mathews, the Court held that the specific requirements of the Due Process
Clause depend on three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
151. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 ("Procedural due process imposes constraints on
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment."); Thibodeaux
v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 1984).
152. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331.
153. Id. at 338 ("In such a case [procedural due process], the deprivation may be entirely
legitimate - a State may have every right to discharge a teacher or punish a student - but
the State may nevertheless violate the Constitution by failing to provide appropriate procedural
safeguards.")
154. Id. at 339.
155. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
156. Thibodeaux, 740 F. 2d at 336.
157. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332. In order for there to be a valid procedural due process
claim, the fundamental fairness of the government procedure must be challenged. Daniels,
474 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Petitioner must show that they contain a defect so
serious that we can characterize the procedures as fundamentally unfair, a defect so basic that
we are forced to conclude that the deprivation occurred without due process.").
158. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'59
Based on a balancing of these three factors, a determination can be made
regarding the procedural sufficiency of a particular practice.
60
A. The Liberty or Property Interests Involved
In a civil False Claims Act suit, the defendants have a property interest
in the money that may be taken from them, as well as a liberty interest in their
continued ability to contract with the government. The Supreme Court has
held that the scope of due process protection is meant to very broad.1 61 In
Board of Regents v. Roth, the Court explained:
"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They are among
the "[g]reat [constitutional] concepts ... purposely left to gather mean-
ing from experience ... [T]hey relate to the whole domain of social and
economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well
that only a stagnant society remains unchanged." For that reason, the
Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between
"rights" and "privileges" that once seemed to govern the applicability of
procedural due process rights. 162
With respect to property interests, the scope of protection extends beyond
merely actual ownership of real property, chattels, or money.'63 Similarly,
procedural due process protection of liberty interests reaches beyond those
interests protected by substantive due process.
64
A defendant in a False Claims Act suit possesses a property interest in
the money the government seeks through forfeiture. Courts have consistently
held that people retain a property interest in the money they possess. 65 Fur-
159. Id.
160. See id. at 347.
161. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
162. Id. at 571 (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 571-72.
164. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) ("While this Court has not
attempted to define with exactness the liberty ... guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment],
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." (sexism in original)).
165. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572; Sell v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied 434 U.S. 873 (1977) (prisoner has property interest in money confiscated by prison
authorities); Contractors Against Unfair Taxation Instituted on New Yorkers, v. City of New
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ther, when the government takes that money, it has effected a deprivation of
the individual's property interest. 166 According to one court, "[i]f the state
does not have a legitimate claim to a person's money, but nevertheless, under
color of law, demands and receives payment, its conduct amounts to a consti-
tutional deprivation.' 67
With respect to the forfeiture provisions of the FCA, the Government
does not have a legitimate claim to the defendant's money. 68 The treble
damages award, along with the payment of costs, compensates the Govern-
ment for whatever loss it may have sustained. 169 The imposition of the forfei-
ture provisions gives the Government an award above that which it is en-
titled. 70 If the Government may take money through a statutory penalty that
it has no claim to, without affording some procedural protection, the Due
Process Clause will have lost much of its meaning. After all, the punitive
sanction in this instance is not far removed from a criminal fine, which cer-
tainly requires a heightened burden of proof.17'
In a False Claims Act action, defendants are deprived of a liberty inter-
est because they suffer an injury to their reputation, plus a potential loss of
future employment opportunities due to the stigma of the fraud. At least one
court has held that due process protections are demanded when a "person's
York, No. 93 CIV 4718(KMW), 1994 WL 455553 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994) (mem.)
(property interest in money used to pay a traffic fine); Horn v. City of Chicago, No. 85 C
6838, 1986 WL 8450 at 11 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1986) (mem.) (payment of money in response
to demand notice constituted a deprivation of property interest), rev'd, 860 F.2d 700 (7th Cir.
1988) (demand notice provided sufficient notice for procedural due process).
166. Horn, 1986 WL 8450 at 11. There may be a liberty interest implicated here also.
Generally speaking, there is no liberty interest in money. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 161 B.R.
776, 779 (N.D. Tex. 1993) ("[T]his case ... is 'solely about money,' and does not implicate
any individual's liberty or quasi-liberty interests."). However, the individual may have a
liberty interest in being free from the government demanding money from them. Horn, 1986
WL 8450 at 14 ("First, plaintiffs' interest here is not only the amounts of money they paid to
the government that they do not owe; rather, citizens also have a significant liberty interest in
being free from government demands to pay monies they do not owe.").
167. Horn, 1986 WL 8450 at 11.
168. The government's only interest in the forfeited money is retribution and deterrence,
and this is not a legitimate claim in the civil context. See supra notes 117-120 and
accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
170. This situation is analogous to that of punitive damages in civil suits, where some
courts have held that clear and convincing evidence is required. One court reasoned that
because the defendant has already made the plaintiff whole, the system should err on the side
of the defendant if additional damages are awarded. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442
N.E. 2d 349, 362 (Ind. 1982). See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
171. In the case of a fine, a person still holds a property interest in that money, which
requires due process of law to effect the deprivation. See Contractors Against Unfair Taxation
Instituted on New Yorkers, 1994 WL 455553 at 4.
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good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him."' 7 2 However, the Supreme Court has limited that
scope to exclude a loss of reputation alone, without a more tangible loss.' 7 3
When a cessation of Government dealings with a contractor have been based
on fraud, the courts have unanimously found that a liberty interest was in-
volved. 17 4 The rationale behind these decisions is that once a charge of fraud
is made, a stigma attaches and severely limits that contractor's ability to re-
ceive subsequent government contracts.171
There is a significant possibility that a contractor or health care provider
will lose its ability to contract with the government if a False Claims Suit is
172. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. See Siegert v. Gilley, Ill S. Ct. 1789, 1798 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("We have repeatedly recognized that an individual suffers the loss of a protected
liberty interest 'where government action has operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or
infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity.'" (citation
omitted)).
173. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free School
Dist. Bd. of Ed., No. 94-7025, 1994 WL 694122 at 5 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 1994); Hadley v. Moon,
No. 94-1212, 1994 WL 582907 at 1 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 1994); LaSociete Generale Immobiliere
v. Minneapolis Community. Dev. Agency, - F.3d -, No. 93-3123/2920, 1994 WL 715079
at 10 (8th Cir. May 11, 1994). The District of Columbia Circuit has held that a procedural
due process claim, when based upon a loss of reputation, must meet two requirements:
Paul and Mosrie require that a plaintiff demonstrate that the government's defamation
resulted in harm to some interest beyond reputation. Loss of present or future
government employment, however, satisfies that required additional interest. Roth
and other recent liberty interest cases in this circuit indicate a second inquiry. A
government discharge does not by itself constitute an injury to an employee's liberty
interest in reputation; a plaintiff must allege that the government has actually
stigmatized his or her reputation by, for example, charging the employee with
dishonesty, and that the stigma has hampered future employment prospects.
Department of Energy v. United States Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
174. See Sekermestrovich v. Jones, 1994 WL 198195 at 2 (6th Cir. 1994); Smith & Wesson
v. United States, 782 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1986); Transco Sec., Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981); Pro-Mark, Inc. v. Kemp, 781 F. Supp. 1172,
1175 (S.D. Miss. 1991), aff'd without op., 952 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1992). A person does not
have a property interest in continued participation in a government program or contract. 701
Pharmacy Corp. v. Perales, 930 F.2d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 815
(1991). An interest only arises when discharge, or denial of a future contract, is the result of
an allegation of fraud or dishonesty. Transco Sec., Inc., 639 F.2d at 321.
175. See Corbitt v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 1471. 1475 (10th Cir 1985) ("Anderson not only
defamed Corbitt, but created a stigma that 'foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities."'); Old Dominion Dairy Prods. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d
953, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ( liberty interest of government contractor implicated by
government's refusal to award contract because government action virtually barred contractor
from all further government contracts and because government's reason for refusing to award
contract was based on dishonesty and lack of integrity); Pro-Mark, Inc., 781 F. Supp. at 1175
(Liberty interest implicated if suspension for fraud or dishonesty creates stigma which
forecloses ability to obtain other contracts).
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successfully brought. 7 6 Particularly in the health care field, the most substan-
tial threat of any investigation is the possibility of exclusion - "the death
penalty for health care providers."' 77 This threat is increasingly apparent in
light of the dramatic rise in the assessment of administrative civil penalties
and exclusion in the health care area.7 8 Because the "gravamen" of the False
176. Boardman, supra note 8, at 1 ("The reasons [for civil actions] are a lower burden of
proof and a higher-probability of success, because of the massive stick the [fleds wield:
exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid programs, essentially the death penalty four [SIC]
health care providers."). In the healthcare area, the loss of the right to participate in Medicare
or Medicaid is called exclusion. In defense procurement, the term used is debarment.
177. Id. Exclusion may be either mandatory or permissive. Mandatory exclusion occurs
when an individual or entity is convicted of "program-related crimes," or for conviction of a
crime related to abuse or neglect of a patient. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Permissive exclusion can happen for many reasons, one being claims for excessive charges or
unnecessary services. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994). The statute provides, in
relevant part:
(6) Claims for excessive charges or unnecessary services and failure of certain
organizations to furnish medically necessary services. Any individual or entity that
the Secretary determines -
(A) has submitted or caused to be submitted bills or requests for payment (where
such bills or requests are based on charges or cost) under subchapter XVIII of this
chapter or a State health care program containing charges (or, in applicable cases,
requests for payment of costs) for items or services furnished substantially in excess
of such individual's or entity's usual charges (or, in applicable cases, substantially
in excess of such individual's or entity's costs) for such items or services, unless the
Secretary finds there is good cause for such bills or requests containing such charges
or costs;
(B) has furnished or caused to be furnished items or services to patients (whether or
not eligible for benefits under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or under a State
health care program) substantially in excess of the needs of such patients or of a
quality which fails to meet professionally recognized standards of health care.
The statute is further clarified by the Department of Health and Human Services regulations
concerning exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid. 45 C.F.R. § 101.105, through reference
to 45 C.F.R. § 101.102(a)(1), provides that a person may be suspended from participation in
Medicare or Medicaid if the Department determines that a person or entity has presented, or
caused to be presented, a claim for an item or service "[t]hat the person knew or had reason to
know was not provided as claimed." For an example of similar regulations concerning defense
procurement contracts, see Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 FED. REG. 42,103,
42,149 (Sept. 19, 1983) ("§ 9.406-2 Causes for debarment. The debarring official may debar
a contractor for any of the causes listed in paragraphs (a) through (c) following: (a) Conviction
of or civil judgment for - (1) Commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with
(i) obtaining, (ii) attempting to obtain, or (iii) performing a public contract .... ).
178. Prepared Testimony of June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General Department of Health
and Human Services, Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Labor, HHS, Education and Related Agencies on Oxygen Systems, FED.
NEWS SERV. (Nov. 2, 1994), available in, LEXIS, News Library, Current file. The number of
sanctions has risen from 230 in Fiscal Year 1983 to 1,265 in Fiscal Year 1994. The cases
mosty investigated were false claims cases. Id. From October 1, 1993 to March 31, 1994, the
Inspector General imposed 625 sanctions against health care providers. Report Outlines
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Claims Act is fraud,'7 9 any exclusion or debarment resulting from a False
Claims Act suit would constitute a loss of government work based on a charge
of fraud or dishonesty. Therefore, a liberty interest exists for FCA defendants.
B. The Process Due to Protect Liberty and Property
1. The Private Interests
The first facet of the Mathews test is to determine the private interests
involved.' 80 The private interests involved on the defendants' side in a civil
False Claims Act suit are twofold. The first interest is the avoidance of the
stigma of dishonesty from a fraud allegation.' Fraud allegations are taken
very seriously by the courts.8 2 People are presumed to be honest until proven
otherwise.' 83 Traditionally courts have required clear and convincing evi-
dence to sustain a charge of fraud,' 4 because as one court said, "[f]raud is in
the nature of a crime."'' 8 5 The risk to reputation from a fraud charge is espe-
cially severe among professionals, such as doctors and contractors, whose
good name is crucial in their business.'8 6 In the case of a contractor or health
care provider, the allegation of fraud could seriously damage its business
opportunities.'87 Thus, the interest in avoiding the stigma of dishonesty is
very substantial.
Recovery of Medicare, Medicaid Fraud, BNA PENS. & BEN. DAILY (June 20, 1994), available
in, LEXIS, News Library, Current file.
179. United States v. Ekelman & Associates, 532 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1962); Hageny v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 412,
428 (1978). See United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 232-33 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
civil action under the FCA requires an intent to defraud).
180. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
181. Cruz v. C.I.R., 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1280 (U.S. Tax Ct. Nov. 20, 1990).
182. See United States v. Thompson, 279 F.2d 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1960) ("Fraud implies
bad faith, intentional wrong doing and a sinister motive.") (quoting Davis v. C.I.R., 184 F.2d
86, 87 (19th Cir. 1950)); Broadhead v. Enochs, 162 F. Supp. 897, 899 (S.D. Miss. 1958).
183. Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 195 N.E. 420, 427 (Ill. 1935).
184. See Lalone v. United States, 164 U.S. 255, 257 (1896); Union Savings Am. Life v.
North Central Life, 813 F. Supp. 481, 495 (S.D. Miss. 1993); United School Dist. No. 500 v.
United States Gypsum Co., 788 F. Supp. 1173, 1176 (D. Kan. 1992); Kovacs v. Electronic
Data Systems Corp., 762 F. Supp. 161, 166 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 701 (6th Cir.
1991).
185. Bank of Pocohantas v. Ferimer, 170 S.E. 591,592 (Va. 1933) (quoting Neff v. Edwards,
139 S.E. 291 (1927)).
186. Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 68 F.R.D. 243, 245 (1975).
187. The public perception of a company involved in a False Claims Act case can be very
damaging - even if the company is found to have acted legally. According to Leroy J.
Haugh, vice president for procurement and finance of the Aerospace Industries Association,
the negative publicity of a suit "often overshadows efforts over the last seven or eight years
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The second interest is protection of the property which may be taken.
Property interests have long been considered of the utmost importance by our
society.'"8 As one court explained:
From its inception, the Constitution recognized the importance of
private property as a concommitant to liberty. The Fifth Amendment
embodies the Lockean belief that liberty and the right to possess property
are an interwoven whole; neither life, liberty, nor property can be arbi-
trarily or capriciously denied us by government. 18 9
Property interests and liberty interests are interdependent, and a loss of prop-
erty rights would substantially weaken many other rights.19° When the prop-
erty at issue is money, that interdependence is even more evident,' 9' because
'money is one of the greatest instruments of freedom ever invented," and
"opens an astounding range of choice."' 92
The private interests at stake in a FCA suit are substantial. Defendants
risk their reputation, their money, and possibly their future in the business
they have chosen. 193 These interests have long been protected, and should not
be obscured by the nature of the charge, or the penalty sought. 94
2. The Sufficiency of Existing Procedures
The next factor under Mathews is the sufficiency of the current proce-
dures, and the availability of alternative or substitute procedures. 19 The
specific question here is what standard of proof is required to insure protec-
on the part of many companies to comply with defense Industry Initiative guidelines ... to
promote ethical business conduct and to put into place adequate checks and balances." Singer,
supra note 18, at 16.
188. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972); Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897); United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d
801, 810 (8th Cir. 1992).
189. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d at 810.
190. See Lynch, 405 U.S. at 552 ("The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation,
no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right, whether the
'property' in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property.
Neither could have meaning without the other."); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166
U.S. at 236 ("Indeed, in a free government almost all other rights would become worthless if
the government possessed an uncontrollable power over the private fortune of every citizen.").
191. See Jewell Hargleroad, Comment, Punitive Damages: The Burden of Proof Required
by Procedural Due Process, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 99, 129 (1987).
192. Id. (quoting F. Hayek, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 89-90 (1976 ed.)).
193. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
194. See Hargleroad, supra note 191, at 130.
195. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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tion of an FCA defendant. The standard of proof is intended to reflect
society's view of the importance of a particular adjudication, and the tolerable
level of error in that adjudication. 196 The Supreme Court in Addington v.
Texas explained:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due
Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to " instruct the
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type
of adjudication." The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between
the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision. 197
In a case involving individual rights, the standard of proof reflects the value
that society places on the particular liberty or property interest. 198 The mini-
mum standard of proof permissible is generally a question which must be
decided by the courts. 199
Standards of proof exist on a continuum from "preponderance of the
evidence" to "beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 2° The most stringent standard,
20 1
"beyond a reasonable doubt," has been reserved almost exclusively for crimi-
nal trials and quasi-criminal proceedings.2 °2 This standard is utilized to
protect the defendant from the immense stigma and deprivation of liberty
196. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) ("[Tihe minimum standard of proof
tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public
interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed
between the litigants."; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); United States v.
Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 676 (10th Cir. 1982).
197. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 425.
199. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755-56 ("Moreover, the degree of proof required in a particular
type of proceeding 'is the kind of question which has traditionally been left with the judiciary
to resolve"' (citation omitted)). Typically, the courts will defer to the legislature when it has
set the standard of proof. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981). However, the power of
Congress to set the standard of proof is limited by the Constitution. Id. See also Vance v.
Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 266 (1980).
200. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (providing a discussion
of each standard of proof), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073
(1980).
201. The level of probability required by this standard, if put into numerical terms, is
roughly 95% probability. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 406.
202. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof is constitutionally required in
criminal proceedings, and applies to each element of the charged offense. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970). For a discussion of what "beyond a reasonable doubt" means, see C.
McCormick, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341 at 962-63 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed.
1984).
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associated with a criminal conviction, as well as to protect the justice system
from a loss of credibility.2 °3
The least stringent standard of proof is "preponderance of the evidence".
This burden of proof is the typical burden in civil cases. 20 4 The preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard is used in civil proceedings, particularly
private suits for money, because society has little interest in the outcome, and
the litigants share equally the risk of an erroneous decision. 20 5 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court in Santosky v. Kramer, noted:
Thus, while private parties may be interested intensely in a civil dispute
over money damages, application of a "fair preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard indicates both society's "minimal concern with the out-
come," and a conclusion that the litigants should "share the risk of error
in roughly equal fashion."2 6
Under this standard of proof, the plaintiff must prove that a given fact is "more
probable than its nonexistence."20 7 Currently, a plaintiff in a False Claims Act
203. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in In re Winship, provided the rationale for
demanding this burden of proof in criminal cases:
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual
should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable
doubt about his guilt. As we said in Speiser v. Randall: "There is always in litigation
a margin of error, representing error in fact-finding, which both parties must take
into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value - as a
criminal defendant his liberty - this margin of error is reduced as to him by the
process of placing on the other party the burden of ... persuading the factfinder at
the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process
commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the
burden of ... convincing the factfinder of his guilt." To this end, the reasonable-
doubt standard is indispensable, for it "impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of
reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue. Moreover, use of the
reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence
of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. (citations omitted)
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64. See also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755; Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at
405-06.
204. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983); Addington, 441 U.S. at
423; Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 403 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (providing a discussion of each standard of
proof), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
205. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423; Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example, we view it as
no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than
for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor.").
206. 455 U.S. at 755.
207. Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring); Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 403
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case need only prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 218
The intermediate standard of proof is "clear and convincing evidence,"
which is stricter than preponderance of the evidence.2 0 9 Clear and convinc-
ing evidence can be defined as evidence which "produces in the mind of the
trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought
to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to
enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue. ' 21 0 Courts have tended to go beyond mere
"preponderance of the evidence" where there has been a serious risk of a
deprivation of liberty or of an attachment of a stigma.21 In particular, the clear
and convincing standard of proof has been utilized in common law fraud
cases, as a protection against damaging the defendant's reputation.2 1 2 Ex-
tremely severe civil sanctions, however, have generally not given rise to re-
quiring clear and convincing evidence.2 1 3
In a civil False Claims Act suit, the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard is not sufficient to protect the defendant's private interest. First, by
characterizing the sanctions imposed by the False Claims Act as punitive, it
becomes necessary to develop procedural protections to safeguard the rights
of the defendants. 2 4 As Professor Mann explained:
(quantified as 50+%); Sterling v. Millwrights, Inc., 26 Cl. Ct. 49, 95 (1992).
208. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1988).
209. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756; Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 404-05.
210. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 n. 11 (1990).
211. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. at 756 ("[T]he Court has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve
fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the
individual involved with 'a significant deprivation of liberty' or 'stigma."'); Woodby v.
Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966) (denaturalization, expatriation and
deportation).
212. See Lalone v. United States, 164 U.S. 255, 257 (1896); Union Savings Am. Life v.
North Central Life, 813 F. Supp. 481, 495 (S.D. Miss. 1993); United School Dist. No. 500 v.
United States Gypsum Co., 788 F. Supp. 1173, 1176 (D. Kan. 1992); Kovacs v. Electronic
Data Systems Corp., 762 F. Supp. 161, 166 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 701 (6th Cir.
1991). However, the Supreme Court has held that preponderance of the evidence was sufficient
in some fraud contexts. See, e. g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104 (1981) (securities
fraud).
213. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 389-90 (referring to United States v. Regan, 232
U.S. 37, 48-49 (1914)). It appears, however, that the Court only chose between preponderance
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, but did not consider clear and convincing
evidence. Heartland Fed. S & L v. Briscoe Enter., 994 F.2d 1160, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993). Further, clear and convincing evidence has been required
by some courts in the case of punitive damages, which is very similar to the forfeiture provision
of the FCA. See, e.g., Travelers Indem Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 362-63 (Ind.
1982).
214. Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions, supra note 8, at 1839-40. Professor Mann commented:
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This proposition is based on two core norms of American constitutional
due process: law: (1) the more severe the sanction, the more the procedure
must protect against the sanctioning of the innocent, and (2) the more it
must protect the accused's dignity and privacy. The logical and norma-
tive implications of these ideas are that the criminal sanction should be
contingent on the use of the most stringent procedural rules and that pu-
nitive civil sanctions do not demand equally strict procedures. As a cor-
ollary, procedural rules for punitive civil sanctions should be more strin-
gent than procedural rules for nonpunitive sanction.
215
As the penalties have risen under the FCA, it has become increasingly impor-
tant to raise the burden of proof required to more than a mere preponderance
of the evidence.21 6 Second, the standard was chosen for the purpose of mak-
ing it easier to bring suits against government contractors, and to actually
encourage these suits.2 17 If society is to presume the honesty of individuals,
it seems incongruous that the courts should sanction a procedure intended to
invite private citizens to question the integrity of contractors and health care
providers in open court. 2
18
Further, the forfeiture that FCA defendants are required to make is quasi-
criminal in nature, and clearly requires a greater degree of certainty in impos-
ing such a sanction. 21 9 One Supreme Court Justice explained, in applying the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to these proceedings, that "proceedings insti-
tuted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason
of offense committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their
nature criminal. ' 2 0 When the proceeding becomes essentially criminal in
But labeling more-than-compensatory money sanctions punitive rather than deterrent
would require the increased use of procedural protections. By calling the sanctions
deterrent, compensatory, or simply debt collection devices, the Court has avoided
developing procedural protections for settings in which punitive sanctions were
imposed... Abandoning the conventional paradigms would require the development
of middleground procedure, specifically designed to respond to the punitiveness of
middleground sanctions.
215. Id. at 1870.
216. 1986 FCA Hearing, supra note 4, at 251 (statement of Frank H. Menaker, Jr., Aerospace
Industries Association of America).
217. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
218. One justification for the clear and convincing evidence standard has been to use it in
actions which should be disfavored on policy grounds. Pinizzotto v. Parsons Brinkerhoff
Quade & Douglas, 697 F. Supp. 886, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
219. Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions, supra note 8, at 1871 (" As the availability of civil
monetary sanction increases, so does the possibility that the application of such a sanction
will deeply affect the life of a person or corporation. American constitutional law's vision of
due process strongly suggests the need for an independent mix of procedural rules for
middleground jurisprudence.").
220. Justice Bradley, cited in United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126, 132 (8th Cir. 1893).
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nature, a standard of proof closer to the criminal standard is demanded.22 '
Finally, the risk of error is high in a FCA suit. The defendants stand to
lose a tremendous amount of money, disproportionate to the actual harm they
caused and potentially their ability to participate in government programs.
22
This is particularly true in the health care field, where the nature of the busi-
ness creates several claims for small amounts. 23 Also, both parties involved
are not private, but rather the Government is prosecuting the case. When the
Government is a party to an action, there is an increased risk of error due to
the disparity in resources and options available to the Government vis a vis the
defendant.2 24
The alternative procedure would be to require clear and convincing
evidence in order to impose the forfeiture provisions of the FCA. This stan-
dard of proof better protects the liberty and property interests of the FCA
defendant. First, clear and convincing evidence will reduce the probability of
an erroneous decision. 225 Second, the standard will place the risk appropri-
ately on the Government. The preponderance of the evidence standard as-
sumes that both parties share equally in the risk.226 However, when the Gov-
ernment seeks forfeiture under the FCA, the risk is disproportionately put on
the defendant.2 27 The Government has already been compensated for its loss
through the treble damages provision; 221 the defendant, on the other hand,
stands to lose far more than she allegedly took. 229 A heightened standard of
proof will lessen the risk that an erroneous decision will be made against the
defendant. 2 0
Finally, the standard would still allow the Government to advance its
objectives of retribution and deterrence. Those who commit fraud against the
government are deserving of severe sanctions; and the intermediate burden of
221. See id. at 134.
222. See supra notes 131-43 and 176-78 and accompanying text.
223. Loose Amnesty Planned for Health Care Firms, DOJ ALERT (Dec. 19, 1994), available
in, WESTLAW, Texts and Periodicals-All database.
224. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-64 (1982).
225. Id. at 764-65 ("'Increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress the factfinder
with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that
inappropriate' terminations will be ordered.").
226. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
230. The effect of increasing the burden of proof is to comparatively reduce risk to one
party. As the burden of proof increases, the risk of an erroneous decision for the plaintiff will
decrease. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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proof simply assures that the certainty of liability matches the severity of the
sanction."'
3. The Government's Interests
The final factor to be considered under Mathews is the Government's
interest in the current procedures. 232 The Government, as well as the public,
has an interest in stopping fraudulent practices committed by government
contractors. 233 Further, the Government has an interest in recouping its
losses.2 3 4 Furthermore, cases would need to be investigated in greater depth,
and therefore at greater expense, in order to meet the heightened burden of
proof.
These interests, however, would not be compromised by raising the
burden of proof with respect to the forfeiture provisions only. The treble
damages provision would permit the Government to recoup its losses, and
thus fulfill the compensatory objectives of the Act.235 The increase in inves-
tigative costs is irrelevant because losing defendants are required to pay such
cost under the terms of the statute.2 36 Finally, the FCA will still serve as a
deterrent, because the forfeiture provision will still be used. Therefore, the
interests of the Government and the public in the lower standard of proof
would not be compromised by requiring FCA cases to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence before forfeiture is ordered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fraud against the United States government has been a target of public
outcry ever since the media found out about the $300 toilet seat.237 The False
Claims Act has been the tool used by the government to fight such fraud.238 In
231. This standard is already used for common law fraud, and probably will not effect
Government efforts too severely. Further, the Government is already required to treat FCA
actions like common law fraud actions by having to plead with particularity under Rule 9(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United States ex rel Schwedt v. Planned Research
Corp., Civ. A. No. 92-1951-LFO, 1994 WL 118222 (D.D.C. March 31, 1994); Boisjoly v.
Morton Thiokol, 706 F. Supp. 795 (D.Utah 1988);United States ex rel. Robinson v. Northrop
Corp., 149 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. I11. 1993).
232. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
233. See supra note 4.
234. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1943).
235. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
236. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
237. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
238. 132 CONG. REC. SlI,243 (Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley); 132 CONG.
REC. H6480 (Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fish).
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order to make the Act a more useful tool, Congress amended the Act in 1986
to, among other things, raise the amount that the Government could recover
and make it easier for the Government to win in court.2 19 In strengthening the
False Claims Act, Congress appears to have made a conscious choice to put
individual liberty behind fraud prevention. While stopping fraud is an indis-
putably worthwhile goal, it is not so worthwhile as to permit the enactment of
an overly severe punishment without sufficient procedural safeguards.
In order to strike a balance between the defendant's rights and the
Government's interests, the burden of proof should be raised to clear and
convincing evidence. The sanctions involved under the FCA are not simply
compensatory, but have a clear punitive aspect. In the case of this type of
punitive civil sanction, the Due Process Clause demands a greater degree of
protection than that provided by setting the burden of proof at merely a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Although the Supreme Court has found prepon-
derance of the evidence sufficient in other fraud contexts,240 the particular cir-
cumstances demanded greater protection here.
FRANK LASALLE
239. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104 (1981) (securities fraud).
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